| Core Architecture | Native zero trust functionality is provided via gateways within a microsegmented overlay network. | Perimeter-based Proxy that uses an inline appliance at the network edge/data center. |
| Security Philosophy | All traffic, user, and device access is encrypted, authenticated, and authorized before connecting to a resource (or the internet). | Implicit trust is often given once a user/device is “inside” the perimeter. |
| Deployment Focus | Secures access to and from any asset (user, device, or service) regardless of location (on-prem, cloud, remote). | Securing traffic leaving the corporate office/data center. Backhauling remote user traffic is common. |
| Security Mechanism | Gateway Agents enforce Egress Routes and rules, backed by ZTA, microsegmentation, and device/user identity. | Focus on URL filtering, basic anti-malware, and content inspection on internet-bound traffic. |
| Access Control | Granular, context-aware access is based on explicit policies tied to verified user identity and device posture. | Coarse-grained, often based on IP address, network segment, and URL category. |
| Applicability to Agentless Devices (IoT, OT) | Physical and Virtual Gateways are specifically designed to act as secure ingress/egress points for agentless devices, integrating them into the Zero Trust network. | Often requires separate infrastructure, or agentless devices are forced to pass through a choke point. |
| Protection Against Lateral Movement | Microsegmentation isolates assets, limiting a threat’s ability to move laterally even if a device is compromised. | High risk. Once a threat bypasses the perimeter, it can move freely across the flat internal network. |
| Policy Complexity | Centralized management (Enclave Management Console) for all segmentation, access, and egress policies. | Policies for remote access, cloud, and on-prem internet traffic are managed separately across different products. |